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esearch on biological samples from children and
pediatric biobanks can be useful for the progress of
medical science. For example, genetic cohort studies
can shed an important light on the interaction between genes
and environment and help understand diseases such as
asthma, food intolerances, autism, and attention-deficit/
hyperactivity disorder. Also, disease-specific collections can
help in the understanding of the importance of gene varia-
tions in the development of the disease in question. Collec-
tions of samples and extracted DNA can typically be stored
in a longer period, and research on them can change with
time. Collections can be gathered primarily for research
purposes, or collections originally gathered for diagnostic
purposes could be re-used for genetic research.
Although useful, such collections also pose specific ethical
problems that are not covered by the discussion on stored
tissue samples from adults. Existing discussions often link
the question whether children should and can participate
to the question of minimal risk and benefit. In this paper,
we explore these topics further in the context of pediatric bi-
obanks and provide some suggestions on the ethical inclu-
sion of children in biobank research. We shall use the term
‘‘children’’ rather broadly, from birth until the legal age of
competence, although we admit that each phase in growing
up has specific issues and therefore requires a slightly differ-
ent approach. We assume that the children in question will
become independent adults. The issue of mentally retarded
children who will never become independent adults is an in-
teresting topic in itself. These children will stay in the custody
of parents or family members or, when deceased or otherwise
unavailable, in the custody of the state when they become
adults. This raises special issues about who can consent for
research on samples of these children or adults. Although
we do not question the rights of parents to consent for re-
search on biological samples also in this case, the right of
the state to consent to genetic research on samples from in-
dividuals in its custody is more problematic. This issue merits
further reflection, but is beyond the scope of this paper.
We also admit that there is a difference between the use of
collections of samples that were gathered for diagnosis and
the gathering of new samples from children with the sole
purpose of therapeutic research. This difference has ethical
implications to which we shall come back in due course.
In the context of biobanks, some have argued that the tradi-
tional autonomy paradigm in bioethics has failed.1,2 In this
respect, the principle of solidarity is used, which is put
forward as an alternative to the more traditional principles
that were first laid down by Beauchamp and Childress
(autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice).3 Be-cause contributing to genetic research on stored tissue samples
typically does not require too much effort from participants
and because this generates potentially huge benefits for future
generations, biobanks have the right to appeal to citizens to
participate in such research. More specifically, this is true
when the research aims to develop interventions for diseases
that impair individual autonomous and social functioning.4-6
Solidarity as a principle is relatively new in bioethics. Its
application to politics and society in general has been laid
down by authors such as Leon Bourgeois.7 Bourgeois de-
scribes solidarity as a natural and practical middle ground be-
tween individualism and collectivism. It is natural, because it
arises organically from all individuals being associated in
society and this association helping individuals. In return, in-
dividuals also have an obligation toward society. Indeed, he
believes that all people are born with an obligation to society.
However, this is not the same as collectivism, because this ob-
ligation grows naturally from individuals only being able to
thrive within society.
This way of thinking can be applied to biomedical ethics to
provide an alternative to autonomy-centered principlism,
without losing the necessary respect for individual values.
The principle of solidarity implies that researchers in medical
sciences can appeal to the solidarity of individuals, because
these individuals have benefitted from earlier research and
will possibly benefit from future research. However, individ-
uals still have the right to refuse participation. Their duty
consists in that they should at least consider such appeal
and substantiate a refusal with valid arguments.8
Even advocates of the solidarity principle make an excep-
tion for children.9 On the one hand, until they reach the age
of competence, children have limited autonomy, and so their
wishes are unknown. So even when there is a strong appeal to
participate, they are not in the position of considering a sub-
stantiated refusal. Also, in everyday life they are exempt from
many adult duties. In this respect, the moral appeal one could
make on children to participate in research may be restricted.
On the other hand, some authors have argued that we must
not assume, for incompetent children, that they would not
want to participate in research if they had the capacity to con-
sent.10 Moreover, we do expect certain civilized and solidary
behavior from our children in everyday life. Exercising1
Table. Overview of the arguments
Themes Arguments
Background Researchers have the right to appeal to children and their parents to ask them to participate in biobank research. However,
this right is limited by the special vulnerability of children. Issues of risks and benefits of participation should be
considered
Privacy risks There is a risk that genetic information is abused by third parties such as insurance companies and employers. In our
opinion, this does not warrant the exclusion of children from biobank.
Risks of physical and emotional
burdens
Children may experience pain or be frightened of certain methods used to gather samples.
Risks of breaches of values Genetic research on stored tissue samples may spread over longer periods. Children may have different values than their
parents and may not agree with certain research to which parents consented.
Benefits Requirement of direct benefit is not applicable to pediatric biobanks.
Requirement of group benefit is difficult to substantiate in case of genetic research.
Requirement that it can only be done on children when it cannot be done on adults is a straightforward one.
Recommendations Issues of privacy risks should be solved a priori on societal level (just society with legally controlled public health system)
and with adequate data protection measurements on the level of biobank governance.
Research on children should not burden children physically or emotionally. Preferably, samples gathered in a diagnostics
context should be used. When this is not possible, the research protocol should be first assessed by an ethics committee
and then by the parents, the researcher, and the specific child.
A child’s current and future values should be respected, and a child should be given the opportunity to re-consent when
research on his or her samples takes a different form from what was originally intended.
Research on children’s tissue should only be done when the same research cannot be done on tissue from adults.
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velop into more solidary adults. Therefore, we propose
a model of limited solidarity for children. Because some re-
search, which is potentially beneficial to future generations
of children, just cannot be performed on stored tissue samples
from adults (for example, if the disease develops or occurs in
childhood), children can be asked to enroll for such research.
But children are different from adults because it is generally
assumed that they are vulnerable persons and so they should
be shielded from too risky or burdensome procedures. Tradi-
tionally, discussions about children’s participation in re-
search and biobanks have focused on the belief that there
should be no more than minimal risks and at least some ben-
efit to the participating individual or the group to which he or
she belongs.11,12 In the next sections, we shall discuss these
principles, elaborate on which risks form a reasonable
restriction to the right of biobank researchers to appeal to
children to participate in genetic biobank research, and
discuss the issue of benefits. We have given an overview of
the arguments that are used in the rest of this text (Table).
Minimal Risks
In pediatric research, the principle is often held that children
can only participate in research that offers no direct benefit to
them when the risks are minimal or, in certain conditions,
aminor increase greater thanminimal risk.13 Also, the discus-
sion of whether children can participate in biobank research is
sometimes framed in minimal risk. Some guidelines and po-
sition papers mention ‘‘minimal risk’’ in the context of chil-
dren.11,14,15 The Council for International Organizations of
Medical Science International Ethical Guidelines for
Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects gives
a definition of what minimal risk might entail: ‘‘The risk
from research interventions that do not hold out the
prospect of direct benefit for the individual subject should2be no more likely and not greater than the risk attached to
routine medical or psychological examination of such
persons.’’16 Other interpretations of the minimal risk stan-
dard refer to situations children encounter in everyday
life.17 Wendler et al have pointed out that both the reference
to everyday life and to routine medical examinations pose
some problems. For example, the risks posed to children by
riding in a car or going to the swimming pool aremuch higher
than the physical risks linked to venepunctures.13 Would this
mean that children could possibly be exposed to higher risks
in research than they are now? The risks may be more intan-
gible; for example, trauma or psychological damage resulting
from fear may be non-existent for one child, but greater for
another child. Children with a medical history have more ex-
perience with examinations than healthy children. It seems
unfair, however, that this would make them preferred
research subjects. The issue is further complicated when the
research in question is on stored tissue samples, such as is
the case in biobank research. In this case, risks will depend
on the way information is gathered and the type of biobank.
The reuse of samples that were gathered in a diagnostics
context will pose different (and possibly less) issues than
research that gathers blood samples from children specifically
for research purposes Also, the genetic aspect could entail
possible risks that do not occur in other types of pediatric
research. Because these samples could be used for longer
periods, until and after the child reaches adulthood, addi-
tional risks that are not analogous to risks encountered in
one-time clinical trials may also be introduced.
Eriksson and Helgesson18 believe that there is less risk in-
volved in biobank research than in human subject research
because of the limited physical risk. However, they ac-
knowledge there may be other risks, such as moral harms,
because the storage and use of samples may violate the au-
tonomy, privacy, or personal integrity of participants. Also,
they see the possibility of non-physical harm; for example,Hens et al
- 2011 COMMENTARYinformation derived from samples can be used to the disad-
vantage of the person by employers or insurance compa-
nies.18 In the following section, we shall discuss 3 types of
possible risks related to pediatric biobanks: privacy risks re-
lated to genetic information, physical and emotional harms,
and disrespect of values. We shall assess each of them and
see whether they warrant the exclusion of children from
biobank research or, if they do not, how they can be best
tackled.
Privacy Risks Related to Genetic Information
Much has been written about the risks to which the individual
can be exposed when his or her genetic information is deter-
mined. As Boenink and Van der Burg have argued, in the con-
text of genetic testing, risk discourse is predominant: the main
focus lies on the reduction of the occurrence of certain genetic
conditions, conditions that may occur in the future of the
tested individual.19 The risks associated with genetic informa-
tion available through genetic research and those associated in
biobanks are different at first sight, but they are two sides of the
same coin. These risks are predominantly privacy related. Ge-
netic information, it is stated, can be misused by third parties
such as insurance companies and employers if they gain access
to the biobank.20,21 These risks are also similar in the case of the
reuse of diagnostic collections or the gathering of samples
specifically for research. They are enhanced by such research
possibly being spread over time and samples and information
being stored for longer periods, and future risks or possible
privacy breaches are hard to foresee on installation of the
collection. In this respect, both types of risks associated with
genetic information (genetic testing to prevent risks and
genetic research generating risks) are related, because they are
concerned with the specific nature of genetic information.
Because genetic information is stable across a lifetime and
contains information about potential health problems in the
future, it is often considered a ‘‘future diary.’’22 As such, the ge-
netic risks are good examples of what Ulrich Beck describes in
his seminal workRisk Society.23 Such society is confrontedwith
risks that stretch across borders and time and are the result of
technological changes and that can no longer be contained or
prevented by individual choices. But risks are often socially
constructed and hard to objectify. As an extreme example,
boarding a plane is experienced by many people as more risky
than riding in a car, because the former is a less familiar expe-
rience than the latter.13 Genetic informationmay fit in this pat-
tern, because of the relatively newness and uncanniness of the
matter. The issue at stake here is whether the risk associated
with genetic information is real enough to warrant the exclu-
sion of children from biobank research, and, if not, whether re-
strictions should apply and which ones. To answer this, we
must first consider the objective reality of this type of risk,
the relation it has to other risks children face, and the possible
limitations these risks would pose on pediatric research.
First, what is the objective reality of the risks associatedwith
genetic information? These risks bear similarities to a concept
called ‘‘genetic exceptionalism.’’ Genetic exceptionalists con-Risks, Benefits, Solidarity: A Framework for the Participation of Csider genetic information to be fundamentally different from
other medical information, because it contains information
about a person’s medical future and might divulge informa-
tion about relatives and be used for purposes of discrimina-
tion.24 However, other authors have specified that other
types of medical information can also contain such informa-
tion, and it would be equally harmful if such information is
misused by employers and insurers. People do not typically
question health examinations offered by employers or medi-
cal data stored in files at the general practioner’s office, and
most people are not afraid that such information is misused
by insurance companies. In a research context, how realistic
is it that insurance companies would hack into databases or
bribe researchers to provide information about certain indi-
viduals, especially in countries where there is an elaborate
and legally controlled public health care system? We do agree
that there is something special about genetic information.
First, it is familial in nature and shared with other people. Sec-
ond, potentially a huge amount of information can be gath-
ered from one single source. Especially with the advent of
whole genome sequencing techniques, this could eventually
lead to the publication of a person’s entire genome. It has re-
cently been shown that it is possible to re-identify completely
anonymous samples.25
Our second question is whether these possible risks
warrant the exclusion of children from biobank research, as
some have argued.26 We do not think that the privacy risks
associated with pediatric biobank research are higher than
other risks children encounter in everyday life. If adults
release health information about themselves without reason-
able fear of this information being misused by third parties,
this is especially true in the case of children. One could argue
that much potentially harmful medical (but non-genetic) in-
formation is stored in databases of public health services
monitoring children from birth until they reach adulthood.
Files may contain the length and weight of children at
a certain age, whether they are breast fed or bottle fed, and
their dental care, all of which may potentially affect the future
health of the individual in question, on the basis of statistical
assumptions. Such information is typically also used for ep-
idemiological research without explicit consent of parents or
children and may be more easily accessible to and interesting
for insurance companies or employers than genetic research
databases. Thus potential third-party access to data is no suf-
ficient risk to warrant non-inclusion of children in biobanks.
Third, wemust ask whether the existence of certain privacy
risks may warrant certain limitations. A recent policy paper
in Science has argued that because of the potential risks
(and the lack of consent), longitudinal studies should either
invest in in-house processing facilities or await the consent of
participants once they are adults. So they believe pediatric
samples should not be shared or sent to researchers outside
the facility.27 We think that the link between consent and
risk is a flawed one. In much of the literature on biobanks,
this link is made because informed consent is often seen as
a way to transfer the responsibility of ill luck in outcomes
from doctor (or researcher) to patient (or researchhildren in Genetic Biobank Research 3
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prevention of risks should precede consent, both in the
case of adult and minor participants, because they or their
parents should only be allowed to consent to relatively risk-
low research. Like Hoedemaekers et al, we assume that pri-
vacy risks can be adequately controlled by policy measures.6
Risks related to genetic privacy should be solved on two
levels, first in society in general (through just institutions
and genetic privacy laws) and second at a governance level,
in appropriate data protection policies of biobanks, especially
when samples are shared. In an empirical study about prac-
tices of 6 cohort studies involving children, representatives
of these cohort studies emphasized strong data protection
measures with coding and restricted access. Some studies
also have established committees to advise on data handling
issues such as requests by third parties.29
Risk of Physical and Emotional Burden
Literature on clinical trials often says research should only
minimally burden children.30 Also, in the empirical research
on opinions of lay people on the inclusion of children in bio-
bank research, a major concern is it should not cause any
burden on children. Specifically, the concern that the gather-
ing of samples could cause children pain is a major impedi-
ment for the inclusion of children in research on tissue
samples. A focus group study by Hens et al shows similar
findings and stresses a preference that samples gathered in
a diagnostics context be re-used.31 However, after physical
discomfort, other types of burden are mentioned. For exam-
ple, a focus group study by Kaufman et al shows that children
might experience fear or that children might by overbur-
dened by participation, especially because they had already
a long list of activities.32 Goodenough et al interviewedminor
participants of a large cohort study between the ages of 7 and
11 years and found that some would not enroll in the research
again if they could choose again because it interfered too
much with other activities.33 This is a risk that only occurs
when samples are primarily gathered for research, and not
in the case of the re-use of diagnostic collections, making
this a major ethical difference in the two types of databases.
It is interesting to investigate why intuitively so much em-
phasis is put on the reduction of burden in the case of
children, whereas the same type of burden seems to occur
when adults are enrolled. This is related to children being
more vulnerable than adults. This vulnerability has different
aspects. First, it has to do with the limited autonomy of chil-
dren. They are only enrolled in the research by means of the
proxy consent of their parents. It may be perfectly all right to
consent for oneself to research that is even more than mini-
mally burdensome, but to do this for another, incompetent
person is awkward. This is in sharp contrast to consenting
for medical procedures for a child’s benefit. Although the de-
cision is awkward here as well, it is more readily made. A sec-
ond, related aspect of the vulnerability is the lack of
understanding of children. When it is not for their own
benefit, children being hurt or frightened and not under-4standing the reason whymakes the proceduremore problem-
atic. Although we believe that children can be asked to
contribute to research because of the principle of solidarity,
it seems that, when such research involves an infringement
of their specific vulnerability, this right to appeal is lessened
or even non-existing.
The assessment of which kind of burden is acceptable is
a hard one and may depend on specific circumstances and
characteristics of a specific child. As aforementioned, the
standard of ‘‘everyday risk’’ does not really apply here,
because children who are often in contact with medical pro-
cedures may be more familiar with the procedures, but may
be more vulnerable and thus exempt from yet another vene-
puncture. Also a 4-year-old child may be very upset at first by
a venepuncture, but easily soothed and pleased when she
receives a small sticker or child-friendly reward afterward.
We believe that, because of the vulnerability aforementioned
and the impossibility to create a burden threshold for all chil-
dren, the precautionary principle should prevail here. This
principle assumes that when there are good reasons on the
basis of empirical evidence or causal hypothesis that damage
could happen, adequate measures should be taken to prevent
potential harmful outcomes.34 One important aspect would
be that research protocols requiring blood or other samples
for genetic research should try to re-use existing samples
and data as much as possible. It is now sometimes the case
that, because of strict consent procedures and the difficulty
to gain consent for existing samples, new procedures are per-
formed even when material from diagnostic collections was
available. For example, large collections of blood-spot cards
exist, which are gathered from newborns. As of yet, these
are not used in many countries unless made anonymous
because of the lack of consent for research and the adminis-
trative burden of trying to track parents or children for
consent. Possibilities should be explored to use these cards
in an ethical way. Also, procedures such as the use of oral
fluid or local anesthetics should be explored when re-use of
material is not possible.35
First, the ethics committee investigating a research pro-
posal should make a assessment of the amount of burden
research would pose on children and the alternatives. This
committee should have a pediatrician as a member. Second,
when a research proposal is considered acceptable, for each
case, the researcher, the parent, and the child should decide
on the desirability of a procedure. It is important that re-
searchers are trained to assess reactions of the child in ques-
tion, so that neither researcher nor parent would allow
a procedure with would emotionally harm the child, solely
for the purpose of the progress of science.
Risk of Breaches of Values of Child
The combination of children and stored sample collections,
be it the reuse of diagnostic collection for research or the in-
ception of new collections specifically for research, pose a dif-
ficulty that may not arise in clinical trials. On the one hand,
samples can be stored in tissue sample collections for a longerHens et al
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ger period, and new types of research can be carried out on
them. On the other hand, what is specific about minors is
their lack of autonomy when they are small and their gradual
growth toward autonomy and acquiring of certain values
when they grow older.36 Typically, parents make many deci-
sions for their small children, but would allow their children
to gradually make more decisions for themselves as they grow
older. Parents, as proxy decision makers, do not know the
opinions of their children and thus make decisions on the ba-
sis of their own values and what they think is the best interest
of their children. A related question is whether both parents
should consent to the use of tissue from their child for genetic
research. Because of the familiar nature of genetic informa-
tion, this may be desirable. However, because many children
are not living with both parents and consent from both par-
ents may be not easy to obtain, this should probably be seen
as a best practice rather than a strict rule. Thus it is possible
that they would make decisions that their children would not
make if they had to re-make the decision. This is, however,
considered part of childhood and accepted, as long as chil-
dren are allowed to develop their own values and opinions
in the course of growing up, as also is shown in empirical lit-
erature.37 In the context of biobanks, this poses a specific risk.
As research continues with time and takes new forms, it is
possible that research done on samples for which parental
consent was obtained when the child was 2 years old is con-
trary to the wishes of the participant who is now 16 years old.
Especially when this research is non-reversible, this seems un-
acceptable, because children have the right to an open future
and the right to make their own autonomous decisions when
they are ready.38 For example, parents could have consented
to a full genome scan of their child, the data of which are still
circulating years later. Or they could have given broad
consent to any research on samples, and the samples are at
a given moment used for controversial research. Although
we do not question the rights of parents to enroll their chil-
dren in longitudinal biobank research, we also think it is im-
portant that the child, as a person who is gradually acquiring
and exercising autonomy, is consulted and made aware of
new research on her samples, especially when this research
takes a great leap away from the original protocols. Thus
we believe that parents should not be allowed tomake any de-
cisions that are too definite. Although to ask broad consent
may be acceptable for adults, final decisions of this kind
should be postponed until the child reaches the age of major-
ity. This does not mean, however, that parents or older chil-
dren should be asked to re-consent to each small change in
research protocol. Ethics committees can decide whether
a new type of research is sufficiently covered by the original
consent or whether re-consent is needed. An objection may
be that asking older minors to re-consent is too burdensome
and may hamper research. However, technologies such as
a website that would, given proper identification, allow an in-
dividual to review his or her consent could make the re-
consent process more flexible. We agree that the feasibility
of such re-consent also depends on the type of biobank andRisks, Benefits, Solidarity: A Framework for the Participation of Cwill be easier in the case of longitudinal cohort studies than
in the case of the re-use of possibly anonymous samples
from a diagnostics collection. In the latter case, the decision
whether research can proceed without re-consent may
depend on the evaluation of the ethics committee.
Benefits
We have described the restrictions that can and must be put
on biobank research on children because of the potential
risks. Restrictions can also be related to the types of research
that is done. The most often quoted restrictions in this
respect are related to either direct or group benefits or to
such research only being able to be done on children when
it cannot be done on adults.
For direct benefits, it is difficult to see how this criterion
can applied to non-therapeutic genetic research on samples
from children. Regular check-ups of children in case of lon-
gitudinal cohort studies may increase children’s health when
information is fed back to them,32 but direct benefit is never
the primary aim of pediatric biobank research, and most of
the children participating may never experience any health
benefit from their participation. In this case, we think that
the restriction ‘‘direct benefit’’ is too stringent in the case of
pediatric biobanks. Also, there is a strong link between the
amount of risk to which participants are exposed and the
benefit requirement. In clinical trials, this is especially
relevant. Children may be exposed to higher than minimal
risk when the procedures are of potentially great benefit to
them. Because we are talking about research on stored tissue
samples and the risks are relatively lower than in clinical
trials, the requirement of direct benefit is less important.
There are two other restrictions often quoted in the litera-
ture on medical research on children and in biobank guide-
lines that have their origin in the Declaration of Helsinki,
which wanted to create an opening to allow research on
subjects unable to consent. In its 2008 revision the declara-
tion states: ‘‘These (ie, incompetent) individuals must not
be included in a research study that has no likelihood of
benefit for them unless it is intended to promote the health
of the population represented by the potential subject, the re-
search cannot instead be performed with competent persons,
and the research entails only minimal risk and minimal
burden.’’39
The second restriction is a causal one and states that
medical research can only be done on children when it cannot
be done on adults. Several guidelines quote this restriction.14-
16 We believe that this restriction is a straightforward and
valid one to complement the restricted duty to solidarity
that we advocate for children in genetic research.
The third restriction, of group benefits, is related to the post
factum results of the research and states that research on mi-
nors should be for the benefit of children of the same age or
with the same condition. Such provisions are quoted by the
Council for International Organizations of Medical Science
guideline, the World Health Organization, and the German
Nationaler Etikrat.16,40,41 However, the requirement ofhildren in Genetic Biobank Research 5
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the group benefit, he says, is that even when there is no
direct benefit to the participant, he or she benefits indirectly
through the group benefit. However, in the case of children,
the membership is not stable when a disease only afflicts
a particular age group, when a condition is rapidly
progressive, when research is spread in a long period (such
as is the case with cohort studies), or when the knowledge
sought is the prevention of a certain disease.42 As we shall fur-
ther argue, this is complicatedwhen the research in question is
genetic research, but we agreewithHolm that there are certain
problems when we try to limit research on children ‘‘intrinsi-
cally’’ by referring to either group benefits in the case of ge-
netic biobank research. In the case of genetic research on
stored tissue samples, it is hard to pin down exactly what
the immediate benefits will be for children that have the con-
dition. Imagine research that tries to find a relationship be-
tween autism and a gene mutation. Many parents of
children with autism spectrum disorder will be happy to en-
roll their children for such research. Such researchmay indeed
have beneficial consequences. An understanding of the rela-
tion between gene and condition may help parents of these
children to cope with the condition, and this knowledge
may relieve them from guilt. Thus it may benefit the children
because it may ease the familial situation. Also, if newborns
were screened for this specific genemutation, it could prevent
further harm by ensuring adequate follow-up and provide
further assistance to families. However, some have argued
that it is not always true that the earlier a disease is detected
the better it is for the patient.43,44 And the discovery may
also lead to the development of prenatal tests, which often
lead to prevention through termination. Although the
existence of such a test may be desired by certain parents, it
is unclear how this fits the requirement of ‘‘benefitting
children with the same condition.’’ Thus the requirement of
group benefit becomes more problematic with genetic
research, because more steps are needed to reach the
ultimate goal, medical benefit, and this goal may be unclear
during the first, fundamental, steps of research. In the first
instance, the goal of such research may be the good of
science in general rather than the health of a specific group
of children. Thus we doubt that the requirement of group
benefits can easily be transferred from a clinical trial
perspective to genetic biobank research. Therefore we
would argue that the restriction ‘‘research cannot be done
on adults’’ is a more straightforward one. We do not mean,
however, that the consideration of benefit for other children
is not important. It is the task of ethics committees
reviewing protocols to always ask the questions, ‘‘Who
benefits from this research, and what are the ultimate goals
of research,’’ with a risk assessment. Enrolling vulnerable
subjects for the purpose of the progress of science only,
without at least a possible positive end goal, is questionable.
It could also erode trust in science with children who will
once be competent adults. And although we acknowledge
that clashes in values are ultimately unavoidable, they
deserve consideration before research is undertaken.6Conclusions and Recommendations
Biobanks can appeal to the general public to participate in
genetic research on the basis of the principle of solidarity,
provided the aim of such research is to aid diagnosis and
treatment of severe diseases or conditions. This counts for
adults and for children. However, in the case of children,
the solidarity principle is limited by certain considerations.
Children are a vulnerable population because of their lim-
ited capabilities to make autonomous choices, their lack
of understanding of the background and reason of certain
procedures, and their right to an open future. Therefore,
some limitations should be considered. These limitations
are related to the requirement that such research should
not pose more than minimal risk and to the type of re-
search.
For theminimal risk standard, we first believe that the risks
associated with genetic information should be solved on
a policy and a societal level. Only when there is a sufficient
guarantee that data are protected and cannot be accessed or
misused by third parties should anyone (not only children)
be asked to consent to biobank research. Second, we think
that research should be as minimally burdensome as possible
for children. Any physical or emotional harm should be
avoided. This means that ethics committees should advise
that all possibilities to re-use material gathered in a diagnos-
tics environment are explored. When this is impossible,
techniques such as buccal swabs or anesthetic creams with
adequate rewards suitable for children and home visits
should be used to make research as least intrusive as possible.
Finally, it is the task of the researcher/research nurse, the
parents, and the child together to check whether a specific
procedure in a specific case is not too burdensome. Third,
as biobank research may stretch in time and children grow
in time toward more and more autonomy, their values
should be respected. This means that parents should not be
asked to give broad consent to each and any genetic research
on their children’s samples, but that re-consent of parent,
child, or both should be evaluated when research takes
a major leap forward from the original protocols.
Children and their parents have a responsibility to
consider participation in genetic biobank research, which
is also linked to some research just not being able to be
done on adults. Therefore, we think this limitation, on
the basis of the type of research, is a valid one. Another
often quoted limitation, of benefit to other children, is
more problematic for genetic research, because its final
medical application is often uncertain at the time the
research is done. However, we believe that any ethics com-
mittee should investigate the potential benefits of research
on pediatric data and that at least the possibility of such
benefit should exist. n
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